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Abstract—Unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) communications
have been widely exploited in our daily life, which leads to rising
concerns about the security issue. This work investigates the se-
crecy performance of a UAV-to-vehicle (UAV-2-V) communication
system, where the information delivered over both downlink and
uplink between a UAV (S) acting as a temporary aerial base-
station and a legitimate vehicle (D) moving along a road is
overheard by an eavesdropping vehicle (E) on the same road.
The location of S is assumed to be uniformly distributed in the
sky, while the locations of D and E are uniformly distributed
on the highway. The statistical characteristics, including the
cumulative distribution function and probability density function
of the received signal-to-noise ratio over both downlink and
uplink, are characterized respectively. Closed-form expressions
for the approximate and asymptotic secrecy outage probability
(SOP) of the downlink experiencing Rician fading channels
have been derived accordingly. Moreover, the secrecy outage
performance of the uplink is investigated by deriving the closed-
form expression of the exact and asymptotic SOP in two cases:
the eavesdropping channel suffers Rician and Weibull fading,
respectively. Finally, Monte-Carlo simulations are shown to verify
our proposed analytical models.
Index Terms—Secrecy outage performance, secure UAV-to-
vehicle communications, stochastic geometry, unmanned aerial
vehicles.
I. INTRODUCTION
Benefiting from their inherent attributes such as flexibility,
easy deployment, low maintenance cost, and controllable mo-
bility, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) have become one of
the most attractive candidates to satisfy the 5G and beyond
communications networks [1], [2]. UAVs are also widely
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applied from the military domain to the civilian and com-
mercial domains [3], playing a critical role in wireless com-
munication systems to support emergency communications,
data collection, surveillance, and environmental monitoring.
In these applications, the reliability, throughput, and coverage
can be greatly enhanced by deploying UAVs as relays to
forward the information from a source to a destination [4]–
[6], or as aerial base stations to disseminate data to ground
terminals [7]–[11]. In particular, UAV-based flying stations can
overcome the drawbacks of the static ground base station.
Moreover, ground users can avoid staying in a deep fade
forever and enjoy a significant reduction in average fade
duration by adopting aerial base station [12]. Many researchers
have worked on this topic from the perspective of placement
planning, trajectory design, and performance analysis, such
as [13] and [14]. Authors in [13] proposed two stochastic
trajectory processes, namely, spiral and oval processes, and
analytically demonstrated that the same coverage as the static
case was achievable and average fade duration was enhanced.
A simple mixed mobility model for the UAV movement
process in three-dimensional (3D) space was proposed in [14],
and the coverage probability was analyzed of a reference uesr
equipment in a finite network with multiple UAVs under the
uniform and closest UAV association policies.
As far as the system performance is concerned, the secrecy
performance of UAV communication systems is of utmost
concern due to the openness of the wireless propagation
environment. The line-of-sight (LOS) links between UAV and
ground devices are more challenging to protect and are more
susceptible to terrestrial eavesdroppers. Since the traditional
cryptographic-based methods are not the optimal method for
high-mobility UAVs, physical layer security has been broadly
considered as a key complementary approach for various kinds
of secure wireless communications [15]–[17]. This proba-
bilistic method can characterize the likelihood of a wireless
network achieving a secrecy rate by considering the channel
randomness [18]. For example, the closed-form approxima-
tion of the intercept probability of a UAV-assisted relaying
communication system was studied in [19], [20], while the
exact expression of the secrecy outage probability (SOP)
between the ground device and UAV has been investigated
in [21], [22]. The trajectories and transmit power of the UAV
communication systems with the aid of a UAV jammer were
optimized in [23] to maximize the minimum average secrecy
rate over all the users and an alternating iterative algorithm
utilized the successive convex approximation technique was
proposed. UAVs were utilized as relays was investigated in
[24] , and the secrecy performance of the hybrid satellite-
terrestrial networks with different relay selection strategies was
studied.
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Most of these works only considered UAVs’ mobility while
ignoring the location randomness and mobility of ground users
and eavesdroppers. The authors in [22] investigated the secrecy
performance of a legitimate ground link in the presence of
friendly jamming and UAV eavesdroppers following a uniform
binomial point process. The SOP minimization problem was
studied in [25] subject to the mobility constraint and location
constraint of a multi-antenna UAV-enabled mobile relaying
system in the presence of a multi-antenna eavesdropper. UAVs
with fully controllable mobility were adopted in [26] to
facilitate secure communication by adaptively adjusting their
locations over time and cooperative jamming. The outage
performance of UAV communications was characterized while
considering the mobility of ground users [27]. Assuming that
users are uniformly distributed, the authors of [28] derived the
analytical expressions for the outage probability and the ergod-
ic rate of non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA) enhanced
UAV networks.
However, these afore-mentioned works do not consider the
secrecy problem. So far, only a few works were to presented
to analyze the secrecy performance while considering the
randomness of ground users’ locations. Ref. [29] characterized
the physical layer security of the link between the ground
source and UAV, while a random number of eavesdroppers are
randomly positioned around the ground source. The authors
in [30] investigated the security of multiple UAV-assisted
communication, where eavesdroppers on the ground and UAVs
in the air follow homogeneous Poisson point processes. Con-
sidering that users and eavesdroppers follow independent
homogeneous Poisson point processes, the downlink UAV net-
works’ security, reliability, and energy coverage performance
under NOMA and orthogonal multiple access schemes have
been studied in [31]. The authors of [10] investigated the
secrecy outage performance of a UAV-to-ground communi-
cation system with a linear trajectory, while an eavesdropping
UAV tried to overhear the delivered information. The position
randomness of the UAV transmitter and the UAV eavesdropper
is assumed for the uplink transmission, while the position
randomness of the ground user and the UAV eavesdropper
is assumed for the downlink transmission. None of these
works has evaluated the security performance considering all
the location randomness of UAV, the legitimate user, and the
eavesdropper, which motivates us to mitigate this gap.
Nowadays, users expect to gain reliable and low latency
service all the time, even when they are in the vehicles moving
on the highway/street. Existing researches showed that smart
cities could not be achieved without a reliable and efficient
transportation system [32]. Among these scenarios, the use
of UAVs is receiving significant interest. For instance, UAVs
can fly over vehicles on a highway to monitor and report
possible traffic violations. The mobility of UAVs enables it
to easily establish the connection with ground moving vehi-
cles that experience difficulties in communicating with each
other due to obstacles including high-rise buildings. Overall,
UAVs can provide an efficient means not only to provide
road users with efficient information on traffic but also to
tackle the communication challenges faced by vehicles on the
ground. Various researches have been carried out to optimize
the connection performance between UAVs and vehicles by
designing the altitude, position, and trajectory [33], [34], while
little attention is put on the secrecy performance for the UAV-
to-Vehicles (UAV-2-V) system.
In summary, no works have been presented to study the
secure information delivery in UAV-2-V systems. However,
the investigation of the secure information transmission in
UAV-2-V systems is necessary to understand the influence of
system factors. In this work, a UAV-2-V system is considered,
where a UAV (S) acting as a temporary aerial station tries
to deliver/collect information to/from a legitimate vehicle (D).
The communication process between S and D is intercepted
by an eavesdropping vehicle E. Specifically, S is uniformly
distributed in the sky, D and E are uniformly distributed on
the highway. The tools from stochastic geometry theory are
employed to investigate the impact of the randomness of S in
3-dimensional (3D) space, and that of D and E on the road
to the downlink and uplink secrecy outage performance.
The main contributions of this work are summarized as
follows:
1) We characterize the statistical characteristics including
cumulative distribution functions (CDF) and probability den-
sity function (PDF) of the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
at D, E over the downlink, at S over the uplink, and at E
from D under different channel propagation, respectively.
2) We derive the approximate and asymptotic analytical
expressions for the SOP over the uplink while assuming that
all channels experience Rician fading.
3) We derive closed-form analytical expressions for the
exact and asymptotic SOP over the downlink while two
different kinds of channel fading between D and E (namely,
Rician and Weibull fading) are respectively considered.
4) We systematically investigate the impacts of the radius
of the coverage space of S, and the height of the UAV on
the secrecy outage performance of the considered UAV-2-V
system.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Fig. 1: UAV-2-V communication scenarios
In this work, we consider a UAV-2-V communication system
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shown in Fig. 1 1, in which a UAV (S) plays as a temporary
aerial base-station to deliver/collect information to/from a
legitimate vehicle (D), while an eavesdropping vehicle (E)
moves on the same linear road with D and tries to overhear
the information exchange between S and D. Moreover, it is
assumed that S−D and S−E links suffer from independent
and identically distributed Rician fading.
One of the advantages of UAV is the flexibility for quick
deployment. In this work, UAV is used to substitute for the
on-ground base-stations that are out of service due to some
emergency (e.g., earthquake) or fulfill the blind coverage area
without any terrestrial infrastructure. Then, we assume that the
location of S is uniformly distributed in the sky. Without loss
of generality, in this work, it is also assumed that D and E
are uniformly distributed on the highway, which is modelled







Fig. 2: 2-dimensional model for UAV-2-V link.
Fig. 3: 3D model for UAV-2-V link.
1 There are some practical application scenarios for the considered model
presented in Fig. 1, e.g., during patrols or pursuit missions, UAVs are usually
used to aid the police on the road/highway to set up communications with the
command centra. However, due to the openness of the application scenarios,
eavesdropping cannot be totally prohibited. Moreover, for simplification
purposes, in this work we consider a simplest scenario depicted in Fig. 1
to propose our analytical method, which can serve as a useful reference to
investigate the performance of other similar UAV communication systems.
As depicted in Fig. 2, the coverage area of S on the ground
is a circle with radius RS and centre O (in other words, the
projection of S is the node O). We denote the height of S
as h, and let the length of OD and OE be lOD and lOE ,
respectively. Then, it is easy to obtain the distances between
S and D/E as
dSD =
√
h2 + l2OD (1)
dSE =
√
h2 + l2OE , (2)
respectively.




, Hmin ≤ h ≤ Hmax, (3)
where Hmax and Hmin are the maximum and minimum
heights that S can reach, respectively.
In order to characterize the statistical characteristics of lOD
and lOE , we use Fig. 3 to address the geometric relationships
in the 3D space. As S is uniformly distributed in the 3D
space, it is easy to obtain that O is uniformly distributed in the
interval [0, RS ] on the Y-axis. Then, we can easily achieve that
the vertical distance from the project of S, O, to the highway






, if 0 < x ≤ RS
0, else
. (4)
In Fig. 2, we let the middle point of AB, C, as the origin,
and AB as the horizontal axis, to facilitate the following
analysis. Then, the coordinates of A and B can be written
as
(√






R2S − p2, 0
)
, respectively.
Therefore, when D and E are uniformly distributed on the
line AB, conditioned on p, the conditional PDF of the length










where j ∈ {t, w}.
III. SECRECY OUTAGE ANALYSIS OVER DOWNLINK
The received signal at D and E can be written as2
yi =
√
PS/dαSihSixS + zi, (6)
where i ∈ {D,E}, PS is the transmit power at S, dSi is the
distance between S and node i, hSi is the channel gain over
the link between S and node i, α is the path-loss factor. xS is
the information bit transmitted by S, zi denotes the additive
Gaussian white noise at node i with average power N0.








2As the main purpose of this work is to uncover the impacts of the
randomness of the positions of the UAV and vehicles, and small-scale fading
on the secrecy outage performance of the considered system, the influence of
Doppler shift is ignored for simplification purposes, which will be investigated
in the future work.
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where λSi = ρS |hSi|2 and ρS = PSN0 .
In this work, it is assumed that the channel between S and
node i (i ∈ {D,E}) follows independent and identical Rician
distribution. Then, the PDF and CDF of λSi can be expressed
as [29]






















, ΩSi is the fading power, and
Ki is Rician factor corresponds to the ratio of the power of
the LOS (specular) component to the average power of the
scattered component. Although there is an infinite summation
in (8) and (9), the expression of the CDF in (9) converges
quickly to the finite series of summation, which has been
testified in [29].
Therefore, the instantaneous secrecy capacity of the down-
link transmission is
Cdn (γD, γE) = max {log2 (1 + γD)− log2 (1 + γE), 0} .
(10)
In this work, passive eavesdropping is assumed to reflect the
most common eavesdropping scenario for the eavesdropper to
achieve the best eavesdropping and to keep itself from being
uncovered. In other words, S has no CSI of the eavesdropping
channel and SOP is investigated. Based on [15], SOP is defined
as the probability that the secrecy capacity is smaller than a
threshold Rth, which can be written as
Pout,dn = Pr {Cdn (γD, γE) ≤ Rth}
= Pr {γD ≤ ΘγE + Θ− 1}
≥ Pr {γD ≤ ΘγE} = PLout,dn,
(11)
where Θ = 2Rth .
A. Exact Secrecy Outage Analysis
Using (1), (2) and (7), one can rewrite the lower bound of
SOP as














h2 + p2 + t2
)α
2































and Y = h
2+p2+t2
h2+p2+w2 .
Remark 1: On can easily find that the lower bound of SOP
given in (11) has nothing to do with the transmit SNR at S.
In other words, increasing the transmit SNR at S is not a
feasible way to improve the secrecy outage performance of
the considered system.
Utilizing [35, Eq. (3.326.2)], we can derive the CDF of X
as (13), shown on the top of next page.





≤ Y ≤ φ−11 . To characterize the statistical char-
acteristics of Y , a useful theorem is given as follows.
Theorem 1. The PDF of Y = h
2+p2+t2


































g2 (p, h, y) dpdh,
1
φ2
< y 6 1φ1
,
(14)




























4RS (Hmax −Hmin), a1 = h2 + p2, b1 = R2S − p2, c1 =
R2S + h






Proof: Please refer to the Appendix.


















2 . ψ can be written as (16), shown on the top of next
page.
Using Chebyshev-Gauss quadrature method [36, Eq.




























































ξiG2 (ζi,4, ϑj,4, εk,4),
(17)
where N1, N2, and N3 are the parameters for the
summation item, which reflects accuracy vs. complexity,
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g2 (p, h, y) dpdhdy
(16)











εk,4−1 − Hmin, ηk, υj , ξi are the Gaussian
weights, which are constants and given in [31, Table














Tk,s = µE + µDΘεk,s
α
2 , C1,s = R2S+ϑj,s






1−εk,1 ), χ2 = χ3 =
1






εk,4−1 ), `t =
√
C1,tεk,t − ϑj,t2,




































with A1,s = ϑj,s2+ζi,s2, B1,s = R2S−ζi,s
2,
xs, ys, zs are the sth zeros of Legendre polynomials, which
are given in [36, Table (25.4)].
B. Asymptotic Secrecy Outage Analysis
To obtain a simplified expression for SOP, in this section we
analyze the asymptotic SOP of the UAV-2-V communication
systems in the high-ΩSD regime. When ΩD → ∞, applying
[29, Eq. (26)], we obtain the asymptotic CDF of λSD as
F∞λSD (x) = µD exp (−KD)xexp(−µDx). (18)
Utilizing [35, Eq. (3.326.2)], the asymptotic CDF of X is
expressed as





























where ψ∞ is shown as (21) on the top of next page.
Similar to (17), we can finally derive ψ∞ as (22) shown on
the top of next page.
IV. SECRECY OUTAGE ANALYSIS OVER UPLINK





















































































































ξiG2 (ζi,4, ϑj,4, εk,4)
(22)
In Fig. 4, we present the 3D model for the transmission over
V-2-UAV link to aid the following analysis in this section. The
coverage space of D is a hemisphere with the centre D and
radius RD = AD = DB.
In order to address the randomness of the positions of both
D and E, we take D as the origin and it is assumed that E
is uniformly distributed on the line segment AB with length





, if 0 < x ≤ RD
0, else
. (23)
During the uplink transmission stage, S is uniformly dis-
tributed in the coverage space of D. Therefore, the PDF of





, if 0 < x ≤ RD
0, else
. (24)
The received signal at S/E can be written as
yj =
√
PD/dαDjhDjxD + zj , (25)
where j ∈ {S,E}, PD is the transmit power at D, dDj is
the distance between D and node j, hDj is the channel gain
over the link between D and node j, xD is the information
bits transmitted by D, zj is the additional Gaussian white
noise at node j with average power N0. For simplification
purposes, in this work we assume that hDS has the same
statistical characteristics with hSD due to reciprocity of the
wireless channels.









where λDj = ρD|hDj |2 and ρD = PDN0 . Moreover, we also
have λDS = λSD by considering the reciprocity of the
wireless channels.
Similarly, the SOP over the uplink is given as










Clearly, in this case, the link between D and E is a
vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) link. As discussed in [37], Rician
fading is used to statistically describe the V2V communication
in urban, suburban, and highway environments, when the
distance between communicating vehicles is small and a
strong LOS component is present. However, when the vehicle
separation increases, the fading gradually transits from Rician
to Rayleigh. Moreover, when the distance exceeds 70-100 m,
the fading becomes worse than Rayleigh, modeled as Weibull
fading. Hence, for V2V communications, it is reasonable
and practical that different fading models may be applicable
according to the surrounding environment and the vehicle
density.
To fully cover all potential cases, in this work we will carry
out our analysis work for two cases: 1) D − E link suffers
Rician fading; 2) D − E link suffers Weibull fading.
A. D − E Link Suffering Rician Fading









where λDS = ρD|hDS |2 and λDE = ρD|hDE |2.




t$−1, 0 < t ≤ RαD, (28)
where $ = 3α .
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Utilizing [35, Eq. (3.351.1)], the CDF of γS is obtained as


































where βS = $BDS(µDS)n+$R3D









, ΩDS is the fading power, and KDS is
the Rician factor for λDS .



















−γ−1Υ (s+ γ + 1, φEx),
(30)




, µDE = 1+KDEΩDEρD ,




D, ΩDE is the fading power, and KDE is the
Rician factor for λDE .
Employing [39, Eq. (8.4.16.1)] and [40, Eq. (12)], the SOP
in this case is obtained as
PLout,up = Pr {γS ≤ ΘγE} =
∞∫
0




































∣∣∣a1,··· ,apb1,··· ,bq ] is the Meijer’s G-function, as de-
fined by [35, Eq. (9.301)].
Using [35, Eq. (1.4.13)] and lim
z→0+
pFq (a, b, z) = 1 [41], for












Γ (bj − bk)
n∏
j=1
Γ (1 + bk − aj)
p∏
j=n+1
Γ (aj − bk)
q∏
j=m+1







if p ≤ q and for 1 ≤ j, k ≤ m, j 6= k, bj− bk /∈ Z hold. Then,










$ + Γ(−γ)Γ(1+s+γ)$+γ x
$+γ + o(x$+γ), n = 0;
Γ(n−γ)Γ(1+s+γ)
$+γ x
$+γ + o(x$+γ), n 6= 0
.
(33)
Thus, when ΩDS → ∞, the asymptotic SOP, in this case,
is obtained as (34), shown on the top of next page.
Based on the definition of the secrecy diversity order (SDO)
presented in [42], we can derive the SDO in this case as




B. D − E Link Suffering Weibull Fading




. The PDF of
the power gain over D − E link |hDE |2 is










where a is the scale parameter, b is the Weibull fading
parameter3. When b = 1, the Weibull distribution becomes
an exponential distribution; b = 2 implies the well-known













Thus, we can further have the CDF of dαDE as
FdαDE (x) = Pr {d
α




, if 0 < x ≤ RαD;








, 0 < x ≤ RαD. (39)
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So, the PDF of γE =
ρD|hDE |2
dαDE



























































Thus, adopting [40, Eq. (21)], the SOP in this case is
finally written as (41), shown on the top of next page, where




k with βS and φS defined in (29).













Γ (ak − aj)
m∏
j=1
Γ (1 + bj − ak)
p∏
j=n+1
Γ (1 + aj − ak)
q∏
j=m+1










where p ≥ q and ak − al /∈ Z, (k, l = 1, 2, · · · , n, k 6= l).
Similar to the derivation of (34), the asymptotic SOP and
the SDO in this case are obtained as (43) shown on the top
of next page, and





V. NUMERICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In this section, Monte Carlo simulations are carried out to
validate our proposed analytical expressions for the SOP over
both downlink and uplink. The main parameters are set as
Hmax = 50 m, Hmin = 10 m, RS = 100 m, ρS = 40 dB,
ΩSE = 1, KDS = KDE = 2, α = 3, Rth = 1 bits/s/Hz,
RD = 100 m, a = 0.5, and b = 1. We run 105 trials for the
Monte Carlo simulations and also consider 105 times of the
realizations of the considered systems.
A. Secrecy Outage Analysis of Downlink
In this subsection, the SOP in the downlink of the consid-
ered system will be investigated in Figs. 5 - 8.











Fig. 5: SOP vs. ΩSD for various ΩSE .
In the first experiment, the impact of the received signal
variance at the eavesdropper ΩSE on the SOP was studied
and shown in Fig. 5. We can see that SOP decreases as ΩSE
increases, which shows ΩSE offers a negative effect on SOP.
This is because a larger ΩSE gives a better channel condition
for the eavesdropping link between S and E. Moreover, the
asymptotic SOP of the considered system gets close to the
simulation and analysis ones as the average channel gain
increases.
In Figs. 6 and 7, we present simulation and analytical
results of SOP vs. main-to-eavesdropper ratio (MER), which is
defined as ΩSD/ΩSE , to address the impact of the maximum
and minimum heights that S can reach, respectively. Hmax
and Hmin do not exhibit a significant influence on SOP,
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PLout,up = Pr {γS ≤ ΘγE} =
∞∫
0
























































































Fig. 6: SOP vs. MER for various Hmax.









Fig. 7: SOP vs. MER for various Hmin.
while a large Hmax/Hmin incurs the improved secrecy outage
performance. We can then have that the altitude of S shows a
positive effect on SOP but not an effective way.
Fig. 8 presents the secrecy outage performance of the









Fig. 8: SOP vs. MER for various RS .
considered system, while varying the radius of the coverage
area on the ground of S, RS = 150, 100, and 50 m. One can
find that RS exhibits a negative effect on SOP, which comes
from the fact that a large RS leads to a large coverage area
of S, and then the probability that the distance dSE gets large
increases, which results in the received signal power loss at
E.
B. Secrecy Outage Analysis Over Uplink
In this subsection, we will study the SOP over the uplink of
the considered system shown in Fig. 4 when D-E link suffers
Rician and Weibull fading, respectively.
1) D-E link suffering Rician Fading: Fig. 9 depicts the
SOP with various mean values of the power gain over D-
E link, ΩDE , while ΩDS increasing. The SOP with a small
ΩDE outperforms that with a large ΩDE , as a large ΩDE
represents a higher channel gain for the eavesdropping link.
This observation is also similar to the one obtained for the
downlink.
2) D-E link suffering Weibull Fading: Considering that the
channel between D and E experences Weibull fading, Fig.
10





Fig. 9: SOP vs. ΩDS for various ΩDE .





Fig. 10: SOP vs. ΩDS for various a and b.
10 presents the secrecy outage performance of the considered
system with various combinations of channel parameters a and
b. The results show that the SOP with a small a outperforms
that with a large a, because a large a implies more information
being overheard by the eavesdropper. However, the secrecy
outage lines for different b, namely, b = 1 and 2, overlap
with each other, indicating that the eavesdropping link’s scale
parameter does not influence the secrecy outage performance
over the uplink of the considered system.
In Figs. 11, the SOP lines for various RD fully overlap with
each other, which means that adjusting RD cannot improve or
degrade the SOP of the considered system. It can be explained
by fact that adjusting RD will influence the received SNR at
both S and E, and then the secrecy outage performance will
not change anymore.
Furthermore, it can be seen from Figs. 9 and 10, the
derived asymptotic SOP can perfectly match the simulation
and analysis ones in the high ΩDS region, which suggests
that the proposed asymptotic SOP can be used in practical
applications instead of simulation and analysis expressions by
exploiting its accuracy in high ΩDS region.
Finally, as presented in Figs. 5 - 11, it is noted that ΩSD
and ΩDS exhibit the same positive effect on the secrecy outage
performance of the considered system. This comes to the fact





Fig. 11: SOP vs. MER for various RD.
that a large ΩSD/ΩDS represents a high channel gain for the
main link between S and D. Also, simulation and analysis
results match very well with each other, which verifies the
correctness of our proposed analytical model.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, the secrecy outage performance of the UAV-
2-V system has been investigated by deriving the approximat-
ed/exact closed-form analytical expressions for the SOP as
well as the asymptotic results of both downlink and uplink.
We consider the randomness of the positions of UAV, the
legitimate vehicle, and the eavesdropping vehicle to make our
system more realistic and reasonable.
Observing from the simulation results, we can reach some
useful remarks as follows:
1) The maximum and minimum heights that S can reach
show a weak influence on the secrecy outage performance over
the downlink, while it does not exhibit an obvious impact on
the secrecy outage performance over the uplink.
2) The transmit SNR at S provides a weak impact on the
SOP over the downlink, while the transmit SNR at D does
not show an apparent impact on the SOP over the uplink.
3) The radius of S’s ground coverage area exhibits a
negative effect on the secrecy outage performance, while the
radius of D also does not exhibit an obvious influence on the
secrecy outage performance.
VII. APPENDIX: THE PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Firstly, using (3)-(5), we can obtain the joint PDF of
(h, p, t, w) as
fh,p,w,t (h, p, w, t) =
I (con)
RS (Hmax −Hmin) (R2S − p2)
, (45)
where con = (Hmin 6 h 6 Hmax, 0 6 p 6 RS ,
0 6 w 6
√




. I(·) is the
indicator function, i.e., I (con) = 1 when con is true, or
I (con) = 0 when con is false. Then the joint PDF of
(h, p, w, y) is given as
fh,p,w,y(h, p, w, y) = fh,p,w,t(h, p, w, g(h, p, w, y))|det(J)|,
(46)
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2 + p2 + w2)− (h2 + p2) and
the matrix J is the Jacobian matrix defined as
J =

1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0










Substituting J into (46), one can get fh,p,w,y(h, p, w, y) as




h2 + p2 + w2
2y2g(h, p, w, y) (R2S − p2)
× I
(
Hmin 6 h 6 Hmax, 0 6 p 6 RS , 0 6 w
6
√





Then, the PDF of Y is
fY (y) =
∫ ∫ ∫
fh,p,w,y(h, p, w, y)dhdpdw. (48)
In the following, let a1 = h2 + p2, b1 = R2S − p2, c1 =
R2S + h
2, and φ2 = Hmax
2
Hmax2+R2S





To deal with the condition in the indicator function of (47),
we first consider y < 1. Now we discuss the following two
cases:
Case 1: φ1 ≤ y < φ2. Thus, the indicator function of (47)
can be derived as
I
(








0 6 w 6
√
y(R2S + h
2)− h2 − p2
)
. (49)

















h2 + p2 + w2












g1 (p, h, y) dpdh, (50)













and Ξ = 4RS (Hmax −Hmin).
Case 2: φ2 ≤ y < 1. Then, the indicator function
of (47) can be derived as I (Hmin 6 h 6 Hmax,
0 6 p 6
√
y(R2S + h
2)− h2, 0 6 w 6
√
y(R2S + h












g1 (p, h, y) dpdh. (51)
Notice that Y = h
2+p2+t2
h2+p2+w2 and 1/Y are identically dis-



































g2 (p, h, y) dpdh,
1
φ2
< y 6 1φ1
,
(52)














Thus, combining (50), (51), and (52) completes the proof.
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